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Abstract 
Media markets are marked by the presence of two-sided market platforms. Television 
broadcasters intermediate between advertisers and viewers. However, the TV industry has 
evolved into a multi-sided market in recent years, with distribution platforms increasingly 
occupying a central position in the market. Whereas until recently their business models 
resembled that of utility providers, distributors start playing a multi-sided role, liaising with 
third-party content providers, advertisers and viewers. As a result, we might expect a struggle 
for platform leadership between TV broadcasters and distributors. This struggle is further 
intensified by the rise of over-the-top (OTT) TV platforms, which challenge existing power 
relationships in the TV industry and give rise to conflicts of interests in the media value chain. 
This paper attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the platformisation in the TV 
industry, by comparing the different types of platforms engaged in this platform competition. 
It is concluded that both broadcasters and distributors are transforming into integrator 
platforms. Moreover, we suggest that this struggle for platform leadership may prove 
counterproductive in the longer term and question to what extent this competition create 
mutual benefits for both broadcasters and distributors. 
 
Introduction 
Both traditional media (e.g. the broadcasting market) and new media (e.g. the mobile 
applications market) can be characterised as two-sided platform markets. Platforms are 
typically powerful and durable industry leaders, whereby a platform leader controls a 
bottleneck, and increases his appeal by sporting a varied ecosystem of providers of 
complementary products and services (Gawer, 2009). As the scholarly understanding of 
platform markets improves, it is becoming clear that very different types of platforms exist, 
deploying a variety of business models, strategies and forms of collaboration (Ballon, 2009). 
Audiovisual media, especially commercial television broadcasters, traditionally operate as a 
two-sided market, in which they function as platforms intermediating between advertisers on 
the one hand, and viewers of content on the other hand. The specificity in this market lies in 
the fact that advertisers derive a positive utility from dense audience ratings, while for viewers 
mostly negative effects are associated with being exposed to advertising messages. This is one 
of the reasons why broadcasters usually let one side of the market (i.e. advertisers) cross-
subsidise the participation of the other side of the market (i.e. viewers) (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003). 
This basic model of operation of the TV industry has become increasingly complex over 
the past decade. First, the TV industry is evolving from a two-sided into a multi-sided market, 
 
with amongst others the introduction of independent production companies that produce 
content for various broadcasters’ and distributors’ platforms. The independent producers and 
rights holders, then, in a sense become a third side of the platform market with which 
broadcasters and distributors need to liaise. Second, the digital switchover has expanded the 
number of channels, and audience fragmentation put pressure on incumbent broadcasters. 
Digital TV has enabled distributors to exploit interactive and on-demand content services 
themselves, control a direct customer interface in the form of the electronic programming 
guide (EPG) and therefore occupy a central position in the market. Whereas former business 
models up to that point had resembled that of utility providers (e.g. cable access like water or 
electricity), distributors start playing a multi-sided role themselves, and mediate between 
third-party content providers (broadcasters, independent producers), advertisers and viewers. 
As a result, there are now two platforms that interact with each other and serve as 
buyer/supplier for each other, namely broadcasters and distributors (Evens & Donders, 2013). 
Another important development is the popularity of over-the-top (OTT) TV distribution 
platforms that deliver video programming over the Internet without a network operator being 
involved in the control or distribution of the content. Undeniably, this evolution will challenge 
existing power relationships in the TV industry, and give rise to conflicts of interests in the 
media value chain. It is clear that there will be strong tensions between all these platform 
‘wannabes’, but at the same time they can be collaborators within the media value chain and 
are highly dependent upon each other. Because power conflicts are expected to inflate in the 
coming years, this paper intends to contribute to the understanding of the struggle for platform 
leadership in the TV industry, by comparing the different types of platforms engaged in this 
struggle. First, the paper provides an overview of multi-sided platform theory and introduces a 
typology of platform models. Second, the paper describes the ‘platformisation’ of the TV 
industry and explores the competitive strategies that are used by each of the platform 
wannabes. 
Platform Theory: Power and Control 
Bottlenecks and Gatekeeper Functions 
Evans & Schmalensee (2007) argue that two-sided platforms arise in situations in which 
externalities arise from the interaction between agents that operate on different sides of the 
market, and in which transaction costs prevent the two sides from solving this externality 
directly. The platform thus serves as a way of solving the externality in a way that minimises 
transaction costs. The indirect network externalities between the two sides of the platform 
affect the platform’s pricing and other strategies. Indeed, many two-sided platforms charge 
prices at one side below marginal cost (and in some cases even negative) to enhance total 
profits across the two sides of the market. In this context, it has been noted that the so-called 
Coase theorem fails in the case of two-sided or multi-sided networks. The Coase theorem 
states that, regardless of externalities, transaction volumes will be efficient as long as property 
rights are clearly defined and there are no information asymmetries or transaction costs; i.e., 
buyers and sellers will bargain their way to efficiency. However, in the presence of one 
 
consumer type that creates value for the other type, the conditions stated by the Coase 
theorem do not appear to suffice for an efficient trading volume, but rather there are likely to 
be continuing subsidies from one side to another side of the market. Parker & Van Alstyne 
(2005) give as examples of continuing subsidies to one side of the market (often even 
resulting in completely free offerings for one side of the market) ladies’ nights, developer 
toolkits, ad-supported content, as well as frequent flyer points on credit cards.  
Most literature refers to the concept of bottlenecks to explain how platforms arise. As an 
example, Jacobides et al. (2006) argue that powerful firms have an incentive to manage the 
industry’s architecture carefully so they become the bottlenecks of their industry and profit 
durably from ‘architectural advantage’. Bottlenecks can be defined as segments where 
mobility (both in terms of switching costs and potential entry) is limited and competition is 
softened. Another explanation of platform ownership lies in the ownership and specification 
of particular critical interfaces (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Baldwin (2007) argues that 
interfaces usually arise at thin crossing points within a task network. Thin crossing points are 
associated with low transaction costs and with information hiding between the various 
stakeholders. The related concept of gatekeeper functionalities (Ballon, 2009) adds the 
element of critical information processing capabilities to the bottleneck and transaction cost 
arguments. Included in this concept is the notion that gatekeepers in information markets filter 
and select information (i.e. the gatekeeper acts as a bottleneck) but also significantly alter the 
informational content (for better or for worse) through active accumulation, processing and 
packaging (i.e. the gatekeeper adds critical ‘value’). The gatekeeper concept is thus linked to 
specific information gathering, processing and filtering functionalities that enable its owners 
to adopt a platform position within the value network.  
A platform should therefore be considered as a collection of gatekeeper functions that may 
be used to attract as well as to lock in (at least to some extent) its various types of customers. 
Platform wannabes need to build a business model around a set of crucial gatekeeper 
functions that help them to exercise a form of control over the different sides of the market, 
and to add and capture value in the process. The form that this control takes may differ and 
shift strongly between various types of platforms, and for each individual platform as it 
evolves over time. 
A Typology of Platform Models 
In order to find a profitable and durable platform model, the level of control executed by 
the platform beyond its own borders of the platform is thus of crucial importance, and a useful 
typology of different platforms in this context should thus focus on control patterns associated 
with the platform. 
A few platform typologies have been put forward during the past decade. Schiff (2003) 
distinguishes between a platform that delivers an active ‘matching service’ (e.g. an Internet 
search engine), and a platform that passively mediates (e.g. Adobe Acrobat). Eisenmann 
(2007) identifies proprietary platforms, which have a single provider that solely controls its 
 
technology (e.g. Apple Macintosh or Google), and shared platforms, in which multiple firms 
collaborate in developing the platform’s technology, and then compete in offering users 
different but compatible versions of the platform (e.g. Visa or Linux). Evans et al. (2005) 
propose a typology of four types of multi-sided platforms. ‘Matchmakers’ aid members of one 
or both sides in their quest for a match on the other side (e.g. real-estate brokers). ‘Audience-
makers’ bring advertisers and audiences together, matching buyers and sellers (e.g. yellow 
page directories). ‘Transaction-based’ businesses meter transactions between the two sides of 
a market (e.g. credit cards, advanced-generation mobile phone networks). The fourth type, 
‘shared-input platforms’, includes hardware and software platforms where participants on at 
least one side need to obtain access to the platform to provide value to participants on at least 
one other side (e.g. software developers need to obtain access to the APIs and other features 
of the software platform in order to write applications for end users). Likewise, software 
platform designers and hardware peripheral manufacturers need access to the functionality of 
the hardware platform to develop products for that platform). Gawer (2009) has also 
introduced a general typology, composed of platforms that are internal to firms, supply chain 
platforms, and industry platforms.  
Ballon (2009) distinguishes between platform owners that may or may not have control 
over the customer (i.e. end-user) relationship, and platform owners that may or may not 
control the assets needed to ‘assemble’ the value proposition of the goods and services traded 
over the platform. This platform typology takes as point of departure the notion that all 
platforms aim at the control over a set of crucial ‘gatekeeper functions’, but may differ 
fundamentally both in terms of the control they have over the set of additional business roles 
that they integrate beyond this, and over the so-called end customers of the platform. In this 
way, four basic platform types can be distinguished (see for further explanation; Ballon, 
2009). 
The first type of platform, in which the platform owner doesn’t control most of the assets 
necessary for establishing the complementors’ value proposition, and on top of this does not 
appropriate the customer ownership (e.g. because it does not establish a billing relationship 
with the end-user and may be even invisible to the end-user) can be labelled a ‘Neutral 
Platform’. Paypal and Google search are typical cases in point. The Google search engine 
platform, for instance, does not intervene in the specification of the content and services to 
which it refers people. Also, customer lock-in is minimal, and no subscription or billing 
relationship with the user exists. Still, a neutral platform such as Google is able to internalise 
a significant part of the externalities created between the different sides of the market, i.e. 
through capturing advertisement revenues, both on its search portal and on a significant 
number of affiliated websites. 
The second type is a ‘Broker Platform’. In this case, the platform relies on other actors that 
control most of the assets for establishing the value proposition, but does integrate customer 
ownership. Facebook and eBay are typical examples of such a broker platform. In the case of 
eBay, the independent sellers provide their value proposition to the buyers, with eBay merely 
 
offering the place where both constituencies meet. Yet, in terms of the customer relationship, 
people are very aware of the brand (and associated guarantees) of eBay, and generally do not 
know or care about the seller’s identity (except for the data on their past sales, which eBay 
provides). Also, eBay supports the transaction and billing process, which is another important 
aspect of customer ownership.  
The third type of platform is an ‘Enabler Platform’. This refers to the case where the 
platform owner controls many or most of the assets involved in service provision, but leaves 
the customer relationship to third-party developers. The Intel platform is an example of this 
type. For instance, Intel has a firm grip on the hardware architecture, standards and 
application programming interfaces, and represents a large part of the value-add, of any Intel-
powered PC. Thus, it controls many of the assets involved in the overall value proposition, 
which is highlighted by the ‘Intel inside’ quality label. At the same time, the main PC brand 
that consumers recognise is still that of the PC manufacturer, who also takes care of the 
marketing, sales and aftersales. 
The fourth type of platform is the ‘Integrator Platform’, which controls many or most of 
the assets related to the value proposition, as well as the customer ownership. Still, this actor 
actively facilitates and encourages entry of ‘third parties’ in order to establish a thriving 
multi-sided market, e.g. by not ‘squeezing’ complementary actors out of the market. In other 
words, it allows other service providers to use its platform, in order to increase value. Typical 
examples of such a platform model are the MS Windows Platform and the Apple iPhone. In 
the case of the iPhone, Apple controls the hardware, OS and other middleware components, 
the appstore portal and transaction system, as well as several individual applications 
themselves. It is able to extract significant rents and set barriers to exit for application 
providers. Moreover, it controls the relationship with end-users in terms of branding, finding 
and selecting applications, and paying for it. Still, it acts as a platform, actively promoting the 
addition of a multitude of application developers to the iPhone application ‘ecosystem’ 
through an easily available software development kit, application developer programmes, a 
transparent and uniform revenue sharing model, and so on.  
This platform typology demonstrates that platforms may control the same gatekeeper 
functions (e.g. collecting and processing profile data, or enabling transactions), but have 
radically different types of business models, dependent on the degree to which they control 
the value proposition and the customer relationship of the services that make use of the 
platform.  
 
Table 1: Typology of Platform Models (see also Ballon, 2009) 
 No Control over Customers Control over Customers 
No Control over Neutral Platform Broker Platform 
 
Assets The platform owner is strongly 
reliant on the assets of other actors 
to create the value proposition, and 
does not control the customer 
relationship 
The platform owner is strongly 
reliant on the assets of other actors 
to create the value proposition, but 
does control the customer 
relationship 
Examples: Google search, PayPal  Examples: Facebook, eBay 
Control over 
Assets  
Enabler Platform Integrator Platform 
The platform owner controls many 
of the necessary assets to ensure 
the value proposition, but does not 
control the customer relationship 
The platform owner controls many 
of the assets to ensure the value 
proposition, and establishes a 
relationship with end-users. Entry 
of ‘third-party’ service providers is 
actively encouraged 
Example: Intel Examples: Apple iPhone, Microsoft 
OS 
 
It has been suggested that this typology may serve to operationalise research into platform 
competition, to explore the different characteristics of platform types and to link these to 
various outcomes for service developers as well as for end users. The choice of platform type 
may be determined by the resources available to a firm, by technological and architectural 
factors, competitive strategies, historical circumstances and conventions within an industry, 
regulation, and so on. It is clear that the kind of platforms involved will exert a strong 
influence on both the platform ecosystem as on the competition between platforms. While 
these aspects have been demonstrated for the mobile applications market (Ballon, 2009), this 
paper will explore to which extent they are at play in the TV industry. 
Platformisation of the TV Industry 
Clash of TV Platforms 
As suggested earlier, the digitisation of television has reshuffled the configurations of 
power and control in the audiovisual industry. More in particular, digitisation has created a 
window of opportunities for innovative video services and has enabled firms to play a much 
more active role in the financing, production, aggregation and distribution of programming 
(Given et al., 2012). Telecommunications and cable operators have moved beyond their 
traditional roles of transmitting channels, but are increasingly involved in (commissioning) 
content creation as well as in directly monetising TV consumption (e.g. through video-on-
 
demand) and even in advertising. Cable operators have not only launched their own TV 
channels, often targeting a niche, special-interest audience, but are more and more investing 
in original content, buying sports rights or liaising with independent producers of TV shows 
and series. Due to long-term contracts with Hollywood studios, most distributors have access 
to the exclusive first-run pay-TV window and control video-on-demand platforms that sell 
previews to first-run programming (D’Arma, 2011). Consequently, one can ask to what extent 
distributors, formerly acting as a utility providers, now function as a mediating platform and 
play a powerful role in the TV industry. However, the emergence of global OTT platforms 
like Netflix and iTunes, and streaming players including Roku and Google’s Chromecast begs 
the question how long traditional distributors, usually operating on a local scale, will retain 
this leading position in the audiovisual industry. 
Figure 1: Audiovisual value chain 
 
Due to the rapidly growing popularity of Internet-based video delivery, the TV industry 
has evolved in a complex ecosystem, characterised by the emergence of (potentially) 
disruptive business models and hyper-competition from OTT services (e.g. Netflix, Apple, 
etc.). One key feature of this complex, multi-player environment is the possibility (or risk) of 
disintermediation. Figure 1 illustrates that the value creation process no longer follows a 
linear value chain, but that digital technology allows plenty of opportunities to lessen reliance 
on their traditional suppliers/buyers (Evens, 2010). Indeed, content producers and TV 
broadcasters can bypass traditional distributors like cable/satellite operators, and build a direct 
relationship with the customer. Whereas in the past producers and broadcasters highly 
depended on the business terms imposed by traditional distributors, they can now use 
technology and offer their content directly to the audience. In the United States, broadcast 
networks ABC, NBC and Fox have launched the Hulu platform, which allows consumers to 
watch their favourite shows directly over the Internet across multiple screens. The opportunity 
of OTT platforms, which entail a process of remediation and renew gatekeeping positions, 
requires content producers and broadcasters to build straight-forward relationships with 
numerous distribution platforms in the TV ecosystem in order to benefit from a multiplatform 
strategy. Hence, partnerships with as many distribution platforms as possible form one of the 
major strategies for creating competitive advantage in the future TV industry (Doyle, 2010). 
 
Figure 2: Clash of Platforms (Evens, 2013) 
 
These developments towards a multi-player environment reflect the evolution of the TV 
industry from a two-sided into a multi-sided market. Although both broadcasters and 
distributors operate on a two-sided market, they increasingly depend on the interaction 
between multiple sides of the market. Television broadcasters  need to coordinate the supply 
of attractive programming with the demand of advertisers, and instead manage distribution. In 
a similar vein, distributors need to have access to a content delivery network (cable, satellite 
etc.) and need popular programming to entice subscribers (Evens & Donders, 2013). 
However, since broadcasters and distributors both operate as a multi-sided platform, 
leveraging common components and shared user relationships, they are moving into each 
other’s market, resulting in a multi-platform bundle, a phenomenon called platform 
envelopment (Eisenmann et al., 2011). As platform envelopment occurs, previously separate 
products and markets evolve, and integrate into ever-larger platforms. Figure 2 shows that 
distributors are looking to partner with content producers (e.g. sports rights owners) and 
advertisers whereas broadcasters are directly connecting with viewers (e.g. Hulu) and network 
carriers (e.g. mobile services). In light of the enduring convergence of media and 
telecommunication services, TV broadcasters as well as distributors (including OTT 
platforms) are now directly competing in the online video marketplace, and therefore 
deploying competitive rather than cooperative strategies to become a platform leader. 
This strategic by-passing behaviour, driven by the struggle for platform leadership, might 
eventually end up in a battle for power and control in the TV industry. The evolution towards 
platform envelopment, whereby both TV broadcasters and distributors expand into a multi-
sided platform to play the first fiddle in the TV industry, often leads to a clash of platforms. 
Although one might suggest that both platforms heavily rely on each other and benefit from 
their complementary interests (e.g. content producers benefit from distribution whereas 
distributors need compelling programming), both platforms are able to deploy strategies to 
 
internalise market externalities and simultaneously harm the other platform’s interests. Since 
distributors have pricing power and decide upon the carriage of TV channels (including 
positioning and numbering on the EPG), they can reduce the availability of these channels and 
therefore negatively influence a channel’s advertising and/or subscription revenues (Kind et 
al, 2010). In a similar vein, retransmission disputes between TV broadcasters and 
cable/satellite operators have increasingly risen over the last couple of years. Whereas TV 
broadcasters claim a higher payment for retransmission of their programming, distributors are 
keen on squeezing the margins of TV broadcasters. Platform envelopment has been identified 
as the most successful business strategy undertaken by platform wannabes, but Hidding et al. 
(2011) show that successful platforms stimulate third parties by creating incentives to bring 
them on-board. It can be questioned to what extent the current platform clash between TV 
broadcasters and distributors helps in building a sustainable TV ecosystem. 
Platform Models in the TV Industry 
Now that we have discussed the on-going platformisation of the TV industry in the 
previous section, it is time to have a look at the different platform models being used by TV 
broadcasters and distributors respectively. We therefore need to take into account the multi-
sided character of the industry and consider the gatekeeping position of TV broadcasters and 
distributors with regard to third parties in the ecosystem, more in particular advertisers and 
independent producers. As previously discussed, it is of vital importance for the performance 
of a platform’s business model to bring all these parties on board and coordinate the factors of 
supply and demand around the platform. The interplay of the various markets (advertising, 
programming, etc.) and the subsequent indirect network effects constitute an important 
element of the underlying dynamics of platform competition. Hence, management must focus 
on the strategies to turn the platform into a winner-takes-all market in order to become a 
platform leader finally. 
With regard to the advertisers, broadcasters are a broker platform. Essentially, the core 
business of commercial broadcasters is selling advertising to providers of goods and services 
interested in reaching and targeting an audience, and thus bringing advertisers and viewers 
together. Digital technology and the Internet has broken the distribution bottleneck to some 
extent, so that the TV industry is evolving from a distribution economy to an attention 
economy. As audience fragmentation continues, popular TV channels that successfully 
capture and aggregate consumer attention may benefit from scarcity and gain gatekeeping 
power. In this context, a broadcaster’s ability to attract and maintain mass audiences puts 
broadcasters in a powerful position with regard to advertisers. Broadcasters may take the 
customer relationship with the viewers, but they fail to control the value proposition of the 
advertisers. Although they control the timeslot in which a particular advertisement is placed, 
broadcasters have almost no control of the commercial itself. But as most broadcasters are 
starting to develop online platforms to build a direct relationship with the viewer (including 
audience data), it is only a matter of time until they will perform as integrator platforms. 
 
In contrast to broadcasters, distributors have expanded into integrator platforms, or, at 
least, they have the ability to control the value proposition of the advertisements. Even more 
than broadcasters, distribution platforms control the relationship with the viewer. Pay-TV 
operators, most notably operators of digital platforms (cable/satellite/IPTV) own the customer 
and have a billing relationship with their customers. They not only know administrative 
details such as address and credit card data, but also have insight about real-life viewer 
behaviour and audience figures through the use of set-top boxes or common interface (CI) 
modules. Whereas operators just ‘sat’ on these databases, advertising forms an enormous 
opportunity for monetising the billing relationship. Distribution could move beyond their role 
as data broker (e.g. for audience measurement purposes) and create opportunities that allows 
the advertising industry to better target and personalise marketing messages. Analysis of 
subscriber data management, through the provision of individualised and interactive 
advertising, constitutes a strong asset that allows distributors to change the nature of 
advertisements and, hence, control the value proposition of the advertisers. 
With regard to the independent producers, broadcasters used to find themselves in a 
relatively comfortable gatekeeping position. Whereas public service broadcasters usually 
produced much of the programmes in-house, commercial broadcasters used to support the 
development of a local television production sector from which they could commission TV 
series and shows. Because distribution outlets were rather scarce, content producers and rights 
holders had little bargaining power and thus negotiated with broadcasters to bring their shows 
on air. Although the Internet has certainly opened up opportunities to go over-the-top (e.g. by 
developing their own platform), broadcasters are still the primary commissioner of original 
programming. Since broadcasters leverage their brand to build mass audiences, independent 
producers choose to liaise with broadcaster (but they can also consider to start their own 
channel to reap the fruits of their reputed brand name as some sports leagues have done). By 
commissioning or developing programmes, broadcasters have the ability to build a clear-cut 
channel profile and create audience flow. Having full control of the customer relationship and 
value proposition, broadcasters certainly fulfil the role of integrator platforms. 
In contrast to broadcasters, distributors used to focus on their technical competence to 
efficiently deliver content over their physical network infrastructure, and passed a bundle of 
channels to subscribing households. Hence, they had little control of the value proposition and 
behaved as broker platforms. In recent years, however, distributors started developing a 
multitenant platform that integrate many competing leisure activities, including watching 
movies, gaming, browsing the Internet and updating social media accounts. By means of 
interactive services and social media overlays, distributors have the opportunity to shape, 
control and monetise the customer experience. Furthermore, many distributors are 
increasingly eager to close deals with independent producers, even before the programming 
has been broadcast on traditional networks. Sports rights have siphoned away from free-to-air 
to pay-TV channels, and distributors usually control the first windows of time after theatrical 
and DVD release (via pay-per-view or video on demand). Nowadays, many distributors also 
invest in regular programming such as fiction series in order to gain competitive advantage. 
 
Even OTT platforms like Netflix (House of Cards) have adopted this successful strategy, 
which allows these platforms to strengthen control of the value proposition. With this in mind, 
it is fair to say that distributors are increasingly playing the role of integrator platforms. 
Since broadcasters and distributors are both transforming into integrator platforms, with 
regard to both advertisers and independent content producers, the clash between the two 
platforms, still in its infancy, is likely to intensify in the coming years. Up until today, 
broadcasters are still the main commissioner of programmes, and claim the lion share of the 
advertising expenditure. As distributors are feeling competitive pressure from OTT platforms, 
they will move into advertising and especially content more and more. Hence, the key 
strategic issue for multi-sided platforms at play is to seduce as many stakeholders as possible 
in order to create a vibrant ecosystem of third-party content providers, advertisers and 
(paying, if possible) viewers. Moreover, platform leaders draw on a variety of tactics and 
strategies to construct a compelling customer experience built on cross-subsidisation and 
service bundling, thereby creating customer lock-in. In a market characterised by network 
effects, this impact of customer lock-in is of vital importance to claim platform leadership. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, the focus has been on the enduring platformisation of the TV industry and the 
clash of the platforms that follows from this evolution. We have put emphasis on the rise of 
distribution platforms as a powerful gatekeeper and the possible conflicts of interests with TV 
broadcasters. Following an evolution towards platform envelopment, it has become clear that 
the TV industry is marked by an intense competition between TV broadcasters and 
distributors, which have both the ambition to become the leading platform and to control the 
TV industry. This implies that the platforms aim at shaping the rules that facilitate interactions 
among a network of industry stakeholders: content producers, advertisers and  the audience. It 
has been suggested that the party who controls this network of partners has the best cards for 
becoming a platform leader in the future TV industry. 
Although it may have been suggested in this paper, platform leaders benefit from a 
cooperative approach, one that incentivises third parties to contribute to the leading platform. 
Instead of competitors, broadcasters and distributors should be regarded as complementors 
that share similar interests. Integrator platforms are said to encourage the entry of third parties 
to constitute a multi-sided market and create mutual benefits. It can therefore be regretted that 
broadcasters and distributors are attacking each other in such an aggressive way. Even they 
have been labelled integrator platforms in this paper, one can question whether both 
broadcasters and distributors behave like integrators and whether or not their envelopment 
strategies are self-destructive. Some of these strategies may generate considerable profits in 
the short term, but may prove counterproductive in the longer term. Indeed, the ability to 
convey a long-term commitment to cooperative relationships seems of utmost importance to 
act effectively as platform leader. 
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